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ABSTRACT
Given the growing prevalence of Internet fraud and its enormous social costs, the goal of this article is to advance theoretical
understanding of the power that perpetrators use when influencing victims in fraudulent transactions.  Specifically, the article
proposes an interactive model, combining the dimensions of power and negotiation from the management and psychology
literature.  We then examine the moderating effects of the Internet on the communication and fraud process between
perpetrator and victim, as well as some of the major tactics employed to appeal to each power type in predominant fraud
forms.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last several decades, the subject of fraud has received substantial attention in nearly all fields of management.
Frauds such as Enron, WorldCom, Tyco, and Adelphia have resulted in a mistrust of the United States accounting standards
and profession, causing the accounting rule makers and government regulators to reevaluate and reestablish basic accounting
procedures (Apostolon  and Crumbley, 2005).  Large frauds around the world such as Parmalat, Harris Scarfe, HIH, and
Allied Irish Bank show that these disasters are not just occurring in the United States, but are prevalent throughout the world.
One conservative estimate suggests that organizations in the United States lose more than six percent of their total revenue as
a result of fraud (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners, 2004).
As described above, fraud has a large impact on society. However, in the last few years, as a result of technology and the
explosive growth of the Internet, especially that of e-commerce, Internet fraud has become a major concern for consumers,
merchants, and governments (Balsmeier et. al., 2005, National White Collar Crime Center et al. 2004). Gartner estimates that
growth in electronic commerce and online financial services during the next three years alone will be one to three percentage
points lower than if people were better protected online; and in the 12 months prior to May, 2005, within the United States
alone, 2.4 million people lost $929 million to Internet fraud (Richmond, 2005). Many of these on-line consumer frauds are
aimed at the uneducated, unaware, elderly, or immigrants, preying upon the most weak and susceptible of society (Lecovich,
2005; Marlowe and Atiles, 2005). In the past, committing fraud was more difficult and resulted in paper trails and other
physical evidence.   However, today a perpetrator can steal, conceal, and transfer assets with only the click of a mouse.
Almost daily, new frauds and scams arise using the Internet and other technological advances as the tools to perpetrate the
crimes. Individuals throughout the world are approached, in many different ways, with fraudulent business deals, false money
transfers, and other misleading exchanges in chat rooms, by email, on Internet pop-ups, or during Internet auctions.  It has
been suggested that 3 main areas of fraud exist on the Internet: securities law violations, crime and fraud in electronic
commerce, and deceitful acts by Internet companies or individuals (Baker, 2002).
Internet fraud perpetrators exert considerable effort in order to influence and gain power over their faceless victims.  An
individual in a Internet chat room who claims to have private information about a public company, citizens of Nigeria who
claim to have access to substantial funds, or illegitimate companies who con consumers into providing personal financial
information are all examples of perpetrators’ attempts to gain power over unwary victims.
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Given the enormous costs of fraud and the growing prevalence of Internet fraud, the goal of this research is to advance
theoretical understanding of the power that perpetrators use when influencing victims across the Internet.  Specifically, the
research proposes an interactive model combining the dimensions of power and negotiation from the management and
psychological literature and applying it to the fraud process. The article then goes on to explain the role of the Internet and
other technological advances on fraud using this model.
DEFINITION OF FRAUD
It has been suggested that there are two primary methods used to get something from others illegally: physical force and
deception (Albrecht, et. al., 2006). Fraud is defined as:
A generic term, and embraces all the multifarious means which human ingenuity can devise, which are resorted to by one
individual, to get an advantage over another by false representation.  No definite and invariable rule can be laid down as a
general proposition in defining fraud, as it includes surprise, trickery, cunning and unfair ways by which another is cheated.
The only boundaries defining it are those, which limit human knavery (Webster’s New World Dictionary, 1964).
DEFINITION OF NEGOTIATION
Negotiation has been defined as “an interpersonal decision-making process by which two or more people agree how to
allocate scarce resources” (Thompson, 2000).  Both researchers and practitioners have spent much time and resources to
better understanding the negotiation process (Lewicki, et. al., 1999) and its’ various influences, including the negotiators’
bargaining history and its’ effects on future negotiation performance (O’conner et. al., 2005).  When a fraud takes place, the
fraudulent transaction can be described as a negotiation. In the fraud setting, the perpetrator and victim make an interpersonal
decision to allocate resources, with the victim transferring resources to the perpetrator (often for some promised return or
false representation).  When the fraud takes place, from both the perpetrators and the victims’ perspectives, a successful
negotiation has taken place.  It usually isn’t until some time later that the victim learns that he or she has been deceived into a
fraudulent negotiation.
Proposition 1: When a fraud takes place, the perpetrator and the victim both believe they have participated in a successful
negotiation.
DEFINITION OF POWER
Since the process of negotiation and its effect on individuals and transactions was first introduced into the psychology
literature, one of the fundamental variables that has been studied has been that of power (Marwell et al., 1969). Power is a
critical factor and fundamental element for success in the negotiation process (Kim et. al., 2005). Weber (1947) introduced
power  as  the  probability  that  a  person can  carry  out  his  or  her  own will  despite  resistance.  When a  fraud takes  place,  the
perpetrator has the desire to carry out his or her will – taking advantage of the victim through deceit – regardless of
resistance. Most of the power literature since Weber’s time has supported his basic definition (Bacharach & Lawler, 1980).
In order to understand power, French and Raven (1959) introduced a framework that has, arguably, become the most
commonly referenced appraisal with regards to power in the management literature (Kim et. al, 2005).
Proposition 2: Understanding the relationship between power and negotiation in the fraud process can help researchers and
practitioners understand, research, and evaluate fraudulent transactions more fully.
French and Raven (1959) propose that power is comprised of five separate variables, each stemming from the different
aspects of the relationship between the actor and the actor’s target of influence. It has been said that these 5 power bases have
stood the test of time (Dapiran and Hogarth-Scott, 2003). Specifically, French and Raven suggest that A’s power over B is
determined by (1) A’s ability to provide benefits to B (reward power), (2) A’s ability to punish B if B does not comply with
A’s wishes (coercive power), (3) A’s possession of special knowledge or expertise (expert power), (4) A’s legitimate right to
prescribe behavior for B (legitimate power), and (5) the extent to which B identifies with A (referent power).  Using these
five definitions it is possible to divide power into various categories and create five subtypes of power.  Figure 1 presents the
five types of power.
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Figure 1: Five Types of Power
This model explains the types of power that are used in the relationship between the actor and the actor’s target of influence.
However, recent research on these types of power in the negotiations process has shown that it is perceived power, rather
than actual power, that affects the outcome of any given negotiation (Wolfe and McGinn, 2005). Even if A doesn’t actually
have power over B, if B perceives A to have power, then it is as if A truly has power in the negotiation process. Hence these
five types of power can be classified as perceived reward power, perceived coercive power, perceived expert power,
perceived legitimate power, and perceived referent power.  In this paper, we introduce the idea that, applied to fraud,
perceived power is used as a means to influence the negotiation between the perpetrator and the victim. As can be seen
above, the perpetrator must deceive the victim into negotiating using one of the five types of perceived power.
Proposition 3: To fully comprehend the role of power in fraudulent transactions, it is necessary to interpret the five different
types of power as perceived power.
Perceived reward power is the ability of the perpetrator to convince the victim that he or she will provide the desired benefits
through a negotiation.  The promise of a monetary reward for participation in a Nigerian money scam, the promise of
validation of personal information in a phishing operation, or the promise of high-paying jobs as a bogus mystery shopper are
all examples of reward power.
Perceived coercive power is the ability of the perpetrator to make the victim perceive potential punishment if he or she
doesn’t participate in the negotiation. This potential punishment is usually based on fear (Politis, 2005). If the victim
perceives  that  the  perpetrator  has  the  ability  to  punish  him or  her  in  any way the  perpetrator  begins  to  exercise  a  form of
coercive power over that individual. Perceived coercive power is a tool often used by CEOs, CFOs, and other executives
when a financial statement fraud takes place.  Executives will often use coercive power to influence employees and others to
participate in the fraud.  These individuals fear they may lose their jobs, or be discriminated if they do not participate.
Perpetrators can use coercive power, via the Internet, in at least four ways (1) by gaining personal information about the
victim through spoofing, sniffing, or data theft, (2) through processes such as click through frauds or other physical
fraudulent means, (3) deceiving the victim to believe that the perpetrator can do physical harm to them, and (4) persuading
the victim that if they do not act now the opportunity will be lost.
Perceived expert power is the ability of the perpetrator to use influence through means of expertise or knowledge. Examples
of frauds that involve perceived expert power include perpetrators who claim to have access to non-public or other sensitive
information or perpetrators who claim to have a special knowledge of a given activity. Deceiving a victim into believing that
a perpetrator has expert knowledge or expertise is using expert power to influence a victim. In one of the most well known
frauds of all time, Charles Ponzi conned victims into believing that he had expert knowledge in foreign postal coupons.
Charles Ponzi claimed that he could make significant profit for investors by purchasing stamps in Spain for about 1 cent
(N.Y. Times, 1920) and selling them in America for six cents. Using this “expert knowledge” he deceived individuals out of
millions of dollars and gave birth to the popular phrase “Ponzi Scheme.”
Perceived legitimate power is the ability of a perpetrator to convince victims that he or she has some form of real power over
them.  Often, this type of fraud involves individuals claiming to represent the individual’s church, community, or
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organization.  The perpetrator assumes some form of authoritative role and convinces the victim that such authority is
legitimate. An example of this type of fraud is the “Greater Ministries” fraud.  Individuals were told to invest money into
programs such as the “Double Your Money” program and the “Faith Promises Program.”  Members of the congregation were
promised that they would double their money in just 17 months. The fraud involved over 18,000 individuals who lost more
than $448 million.  In 2001, five leaders of the Greater Ministries International Church were convicted in federal court on a
total of 72 counts of conspiracy, wire and mail fraud, and money laundering (Gibelman and Gelman, 2003).
Perceived reference power is the ability of the perpetrator to relate to the target of influence. Perpetrators will build
relationships of confidence with a victim via an Internet chat room or other media. Perpetrators often use perceived reference
power to gain confidence from victims and deceive them into fraud.  Perceived reference power is possible because
perpetrators characteristics, unlike other criminals, are very similar to the general population’s characteristics (Romney,
1980). When fraud does occur, one of the most common reactions by those around the fraud is denial.  Victims can’t believe
that he or she, a trusted friend, would deceive them and behave dishonestly (Albrecht, 2006).
DECEPTION
There are many cases where deception has been used in the negotiation process (Schweitzer, 1997). Not only is deception a
part of many negotiations, but it has also been suggested that deception increases as the incentives for performance increase
(Tenbrunsal, 1998).  Deceitful negotiation has been used to fraudulently manipulate individuals throughout history.  In the
negotiation process it is deception that allows the perpetrator to falsely exercise power over the victim. The theory of
deception identifies seven operational tactics employed to deceive a victim (Grazioli and Jarvenpaa 2003b; Johnson et al.
2001). As a primarily tactical model, it compliments our model of power types, suggesting the specific mechanisms that the
con artist may employ to realize specific power forms over the victim.
Available Tactics in the Theory of Deception-
from (Grazioli and Jarvenpaa 2003b)
Tactic Definition
Masking Hiding or destroying critical information
Dazzling Disguising critical information
Decoying Distracting the victim’s attention away from critical information.
Mimicking Assuming someone else’s identity, or impersonating someone else.
Inventing Making up information.
Relabeling Presenting information in a misleading way.
Double play Suggesting to victim that the victim is taking advantage of the deceiver.
Table 1: Available Tactics in the Theory of Deception
For example, research suggests that con-artists pretending to be businesses prefer masking, and relabeling, thereby achieving
expert and legitimate power (Grazioli and Jarvenpaa, 2003a). Specifically focused on the Internet, Grazioli and Jarvenpaa
(2000) studied the effectiveness of dazzling, inventing, and relabeling for disguising fraudulent web sites, often used to
achieve reward, expert and referent power.
POWER AND DECEPTION ON THE INTERNET
Along with the developments in the Internet, opportunities to commit fraud and unethical acts have become more available.
The Internet has created opportunities to exert perceived power and negotiation skills that were unheard of 20 years ago. And
as technology continues to advance, perpetrators find new means and ways to deceive individuals and commit fraud.
Proposition 4: The Internet has become a significant, new instrument in the negotiation process between perpetrators and
victims.
According to U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics (2004), the majority of perpetrators of Internet fraud make
contact with the victim through e-mail (63.5%) or a webpage (23.5%). Internet auction fraud was by far the most common
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(71.2%), but in terms of the size of the losses, check fraud ($3,600), Nigerian letter fraud ($3,000), and confidence fraud
($1,000) were the largest.
It has been suggested that fraud like other crime, can best be explained by three distinct factors: (1) a supply of motivated
offenders, (2) the availability of suitable targets, and (3) the absence of capable guardians (Cohen and Felson, 1979;
Krambia-Kapardis, 2001).
First, the Internet supplies a gathering place for an endless supply of offenders.  The connectivity and global reach provided
by the Internet means that these offenders can be anywhere in the world and through the Internet can communicate with
anyone. Communication through email, the primary method of contacting victims, is instantaneous and practically free due to
low transaction costs. The Internet also allows offenders the ability to easily customize their scams to individual users and the
flexibility to quickly change the scam once it is discovered. In auctions alone, Chua and Wareham (2004) identified 11
different types of fraud, and state that “con artists know that developing specialized fraud schemes increases their profits
while minimizing their risk of capture” (p. 33).
Second, the Internet supplies numerous suitable targets.  Victims can be approached through e-mail, chat rooms, pop-up adds,
websites and numerous other media via the Internet. Web sites like eBay, with its 181 million registered users worldwide,
provide offenders with easy access to a large number of potential victims. However, access to potential victims is not
exclusive to the Internet. Perpetrators of fraud can obtain personal information in a number of ways, including: stealing
wallets, purses or credit cards; stealing mail or through sending a fraudulent address change form; through viruses or
spyware; or through unsolicited emails or telephone calls, and in over half the cases the offender has a prior relationship with
the victim (Diller-Haas, 2004).
Third, the Internet provides a perfect scenario for fraudulent activity with few or no capable guardians.  The Internet has no
boundaries; it crosses communities, cultures, and countries. Much fraud crosses national and international legal jurisdictions,
and, hence, perpetrators have little risk of getting caught or punished.  For example, while many states within the United
States have statutes relating to Cybercrime such as money laundering, identity theft, online gambling, and cyber stalking,
there is no standard and the rules vary from state to state (Brenner, 2001).  Because most of these statutes were written before
the Internet existed, the statutes only relate to property, computer, or other types of illegal acts and do not specifically address
Cybercrime. Fraud is a covert crime, making collection of evidence for prosecution difficult; it is nonviolent so it receives
less evidence by society and lower priority by law enforcement; most Internet frauds are small and thus victims have little
incentive to prosecute; and when offenders are caught they often receive light sentences (Chua and Wareham, 2004).
Proposition 5: Fraud is becoming more widespread because the Internet supplies a gathering place for an endless supply of
offenders, offers numerous suitable targets, and provides a scenario for fraudulent activity with few or no capable guardians.
A COMPREHENSIVE MODEL
To understand the interaction between power, negotiation, and the Internet, the following model is presented.  On the left are
French and Raven’s five types of power. The offender will use the five types of power to deceive the victim into the
negotiation. The middle box represents deception, which is enhanced through technological advances, such as the Internet,
electronic commerce, or any other technological media used for communication. The right hand box represents the victim,
including the victim’s emotions that the perpetrator will try to manipulate and use in the deception process. The successful
negotiation is the final outcome of the perpetrator using power to deceive via the Internet the victim by manipulating the
victim’s emotions.
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Figure 2: The Cybercrime Framework
In all scams, there is some perceived reward that is never fully realized, or is misrepresented in some way, whether in the
form of money, which never arrives, or goods or services, which are not provided or are somehow less than that which was
promised.  The key to whether the negotiation is successful or not hinges on the perception on the part of the victim as to the
size of the reward as well as the victim’s perception that the offender is legitimate. The perceived expert power has a positive
relationship with perceived legitimate power. Furthermore, the perceived referent power is increased through repeated
interactions between offender and victim, and also has a positive relationship with perceived legitimate power. Coercive
power is generally used to create the impression that the offer is unique and for a limited time, and can create a sense of
urgency in the negotiation.
To illustrate this model, we present the top ten Internet scams of 2005 in Table 2 (Internet Fraud Watch, 2005). In the table,
we posit how each type of fraud appeals to a specific type of power, as well as the predominant deceit tactics employed to
exercise each power.
Perpetrator Perceived
Reward Power
Perceived
Coercive
Power
Perceived
Expert
Power
Perceived
Legitimate
Power
Perceived
Referent
Power
Victim Desire for a
Reward or
Benefit
Fear of
Punishment
Desire for a
Need or
Want
Level of
Obedience
Relationship
Needs
Deception via the
Internet
Dazzling
Decoying
Mimicking
Inventing
Relabeling
Mimicking
Inventing
Double play
Decoying
Dazzling
Mimicking
Relabeling
Decoying
Mimicking
Relabeling
Double
play
Dazzling
Mimicking
Inventing
Double play
Auctions Seller
misrepresents
product;
Shilling/collusion
Auction
fever-
buyers must
act before
Seller may
pose as
expert in
antiques or
Reputation
scores –
can be
inflated by
Trust
relationship
created
through
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artificially
increases price
auction
close
one-of-a-
kind
merchandise.
Cut and
paste from
real experts
seller
Seller poses
as reputable
company
community
forums
General
Merchandise
Seller
misrepresents
product
Seller may
pose as
expert in
antiques or
one-of-a-
kind
merchandise.
Cut and
paste from
real experts
Seller poses
as reputable
company
Seller creates
trust through
interactions
with buyer
Nigerian Money
Offers
Promise of large
financial rewards
Offer is
confidential
and  for  a
limited time
Offender
poses as
high
government
official –
gives
evidence of
legitimacy
Appeals to
needs of
under-
developed
regions
Fake Checks Victim perceives
that checks are
valid
Victim
perceives
that
offender
represents a
legitimate
company
Offender
creates trust
relationship
through
interactions
with victim
Lotteries Promise of large
financial rewards
Offer is for
a limited
time
Offender
poses as a
reputable
institution
Phishing Victim expects
validation of
personal
information
Offender
argues that
user data
has been
stolen hence
possible
injury –
updates
required
Offender
poses as a
reputable
institution
known to
the victim
Advance Fee Loans Victim is
promised loan in
spite of his/her
bad credit
Offender
poses as a
reputable
institution
Information/Adult
Services
Victim receives
expected services
but with hidden
Offender
poses as a
legitimate
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conditions institution
Work-at-Home Promise of large
financial rewards
Offender
poses as
expert in
home
businesses
Offender
poses as a
reputable
institution
Internet Access
Services
Cost of services
misrepresented
or services not
provided
Offender
poses as a
reputable
institution
Table 2: Internet Crime within the Cybercrime Framework
The perceived reward in auctions can be manipulated through various means. The seller can engage in shilling or bid
shielding, where the price of the goods is artificially driven up through some behavior on the part of the seller. This creates
the impression that the goods are more in demand than they actually are, resulting in higher bids from “legitimate” buyers.
The goods can also be misrepresented, where the seller describes an item incorrectly and thus the actual reward is less than
what is perceived. Auctions also have a coercive nature, where the buyers feel that they must act immediately or lose a
unique opportunity.
Perceived expert power can be exercised in auctions, for example, in the case of goods which are supposedly antiques or one-
of-a-kind, and the seller poses as a knowledgeable collector.
Perceived legitimate power can be created through the reputation scores which maintained on auction sites based on the
number of situations where the buyer is satisfied or dissatisfied. These scores can be manipulated, however, through
“phantom” trades where the seller poses as a buyer on various trades and gives himself positive ratings, thus artificially
elevating his reputation score.
Finally, perceived referent power can be obtained through the reputation scores as well as other community forums on the
auction sites, where buyers and sellers can interact and perpetrators can gain the confidence of their potential victims.
For each power form, we explore how the Internet enables specific tactics like mimicking, inventing, and relabling relatively
easy to execute. The increased anonymity, global reach and low barriers to entry enable fraudulent activity from all parts of
the world.
FUTURE RESEARCH
Our model identifies five types of power, the primary tactics utilized to realize the power, and the common fraud types where
these elements are manifest. The next step in this research is rigorous empirical validation with both aggregate data analysis
as  well  as  controlled  experimentation.  Understanding  the  ways  in  which  perpetrators  of  fraud  are  able  to  exert  these  five
types of power across the Internet is a first step towards helping regulators, companies and individuals develop better
strategies for its control and prevention.
CONCLUSION
Our purpose is to advance theoretical understanding of the specific power forms that perpetrators use when influencing
victims in fraudulent transactions.  Our model combines the dimensions of power and negotiation from the management and
psychological literature as well as Internet fraud research from the Information Systems field.  We then examine the
moderating effects of the Internet on the communication and fraud process between perpetrator and victim, as well as
deception tactics employed to realize each power type in frequently occurring fraud forms.
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